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Abstract 
With the establishment of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
in 1999, the EU aimed to tackle challenges in the field of security by 
deploying various police and military missions in troubled crisis areas. The 
consolidation of the CSDP raised hopes for the EU’s role in external affairs. 
However, the majority of CSDP missions are still on a small scale. Strategic 
disagreements among EU partners persist on issues of UN legality, NATO-
neutrality and the geographic deployment of missions. This lack of 
consensus is due to a lack of common ideas, values and practices regarding 
the use of police and military force in Europe. In short: there is no common 
strategic culture. 
This paper analyses some of the major provisions of the Lisbon Treaty that 
i m p a c t  u p o n  t h e  C S D P .  I t  a r g u e s  t h a t  a l t h o u g h  s o m e  o f  t h e s e  p r o v i s i o n s  
sound positive on paper, they will not necessarily enhance the development 
of a common strategic culture. And without the consolidation of such a 
culture, the CSDP cannot deliver ambitious results. A strong commitment to 
invest in capabilities and the political will to assume more responsibility in 
the field of security are necessary prerequisites for further progress in the 
CSDP.  
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* 
1. Introduction 
With the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999, the EU 
achieved considerable progress regarding the institutionalisation of its foreign policy. Over the 
years, the EU security and defence framework became equipped with its own institutions such 
as the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee (EUMC), the 
Committee of Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) and the EU Military Staff 
(EUMS). Ten years of ESDP evolution has led to a number of achievements in the field of 
security, most notably, the deployment of various missions in many parts of the world.  
Although the Lisbon Treaty partly addressed some of the issues that hinder the development of 
a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), it did not remedy to the problems that affected 
the actorness of the EU in the field of security and defence. The new Lisbon Treaty 
developments in the field of CFSP/ESDP are summarised in this paper. The Lisbon Treaty 
renames ESDP to CSDP as the first letter of the former acronym that stood for ‘European’ is 
substituted by the word ‘Common’. Still, the EU is far from possessing a truly ‘common’ 
security and defence policy as it has no cohesive strategic culture. The paper concludes that the 
CSDP needs a clear set of common values in order to become more cohesive and successful.  
2.  The impact of the Lisbon Treaty on CFSP/CSDP 
Previously, the competencies of the EU in external relations were divided between the 
competencies of the European Community and the other intergovernmental pillars. This division 
created various problems as the allocation of responsibilities in inter-related areas was not clear. 
For instance, there were at least four different Directorates-General (DGs) involved in the 
external relations of the EU. Lack of transparency, a rigid bureaucracy and institutional 
competition among different DGs were common obstacles to the shaping of coherent EU 
foreign policies.  
Various provisions in the Treaty of Lisbon aimed at addressing the lack of cohesion and 
effectiveness, with the establishment of various new institutional developments. The 
rationalisation of external competencies brought by the Lisbon Treaty may have a positive 
impact in the field of security and defence. For this reason, the most important developments in 
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the field of CFSP/CSDP will be looked at in this paper: the upgraded post of the High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the establishment of the European 
External Action Service (EEAS), the provision of Permanent Structured Cooperation 
(PermStrucCoop), and the extended version of the Petersberg Tasks (see section below for a 
definition of these tasks).  
The post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy and the European External Action Service 
First of all, the post of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy brings 
together all aspects of EU external action. The post of High Representative was established in 
1999 in order to provide a better focus for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 
The High Representative is now a member of the Commission and in charge of External 
Relations. The new High Representative is charged with the important role of ensuring 
coherence between EU institutions and between the institutions and member states. The High 
Representative replaces the rotating Presidency as CFSP ‘director’ and represents the EU to 
third parties and within international organisations. The High Representative is supported by the 
newly established European External Action Service (EEAS), which will consist of personnel 
from the Council General Secretariat, the Commission and staff from national diplomatic 
services. It is expected that such a post will play a positive role as it combines the functions of 
the previous post of CFSP High Representative, along with those of the Commissioner for 
External Relations in the European Commission.  
The functions of harmonisation and coordination that are assigned to the post of High 
Representative will help to consolidate a more dynamic EU presence in external affairs. The 
High Representative will work closely with the EEAS, which should bring an ‘ambassadorial’ 
status to the institutional framework of the EU. Consequently, it is expected that the new post 
will have a positive ‘spill-over’ effect on the field of security. In terms of CSDP structures, the 
HR will act under the authority of the Council and be in close contact with the Political and 
Security Committee (PSC). The Treaty of Lisbon does not alter the institutional dimension of 
the CSDP, as the PSC remains the main body that discusses and manages CSDP missions. 
However, it mentions that the High Representative, acting under the authority of the Council 
and in close contact with the Political and Security Committee, shall ensure the coordination of 
the civilian and military aspects of such tasks. The High Representative therefore has a more 
important role to play in CSDP affairs.  
Whether the Lisbon Treaty developments will lead to more efficiency and coherence or, on the 
contrary, to institutional blockages, overlapping competencies and inter-institutional tensions is 
a question that so far cannot be answered.
1 The organisational details of these new institutional 
inventions are not yet decided, and diverging views among member states and EU institutions 
already appear on how these institutions will be created and what exactly their functions will be. 
Unfortunately, the struggle regarding the creation of the EEAS between states and EU 
institutions only serves to demonstrate that such newly established institutions can become the 
epicentre of ‘internal power struggles’ that go far beyond the question of securing efficiency in 
the field of EU actorness. The process of ‘clarification’ of some of the Lisbon Treaty provisions 
may already lead to the further bureaucratisation of CSFP/CSDP by creating complicated 
structures. Such an outcome might reflect the internal power balance of the EU but would fail to 
provide rapid and efficient responses to the emerging geopolitical challenges.  
                                                      
1 For instance, see Wessels & Bopp (2008), The Institutional Architecture of CFSP after the Lisbon 
Treaty – Constitutional breakthrough or challenge ahead?, CHALLENGE Research Paper No. 10, 
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It is also interesting to see how the relationship between the High Representative and the 
President of the European Council develops in order to achieve a coherent division of tasks. 
According to the Lisbon Treaty, the President of the European Council needs to ensure the 
external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security 
policy, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy. The manner in which the President of the European Council will 
‘ensure’ the external representation of the Union is important, as a working relationship with the 
Higher Representative needs to be clarified. In this respect, personalities are important. So far, 
EU member states have chosen ‘low-profile’ figures – Herman Van Rompuy and Catherine 
Ashton – for the two key EU posts. It remains to be seen whether these nominees will deliver 
more than a ‘low profile’ external policy on behalf of the EU.  
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PermStrucCoop) 
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PermStrucCoop) is another important provision included in 
the Lisbon Treaty. According to the Treaty, PermStrucCoop shall be open to any member state 
that undertakes more intensively to develop its defence capacities in multinational forces. 
Participating member states shall be involved in pooling together and harmonising their security 
and defence resources. The European Defence Agency (EDA) is also becoming part of the 
Treaty. Nevertheless, although the Treaty legally recognises the EDA, it does not necessarily 
empower the role of the institution with additional competencies. The EDA has been 
undermined by particular national hindrances and, especially, the intransigent policy positions 
of the UK on certain aspects of defence capabilities. Furthermore, according to the Treaty, it is 
expected that the EDA will play an important role in evaluating the performance of member 
states’ commitment to PermStrucCoop. Such an evaluation may prove useful if projects 
materialise. However, it is clearly stated that the participation at EDA projects depends on the 
will of the EU member states. So far, there has been no major enthusiasm on the part of the 
member states for further strategic integration through PermStrucCoop involvement.  
In theory, the inclusive nature of PermStrucCoop will permit as many member states as possible 
to participate in common defence plans. Articles 27 (6) and 30 of the Treaty reflect upon the 
idea of PermStrucCoop among EU member states. The Articles provide details on the expansion 
of group membership as well as punishment in the form of suspension for failing to satisfy 
group obligations. PermStrucCoop may help to create caucuses of states that want to deepen 
their cooperation in defence-related tasks. It can work on the basis of common requirements and 
help to motivate neighbouring countries to cooperate together in common projects. Military 
budgets have been severely cut in recent years and will probably be reduced even further in 
order to save resources in hard financial times. Pooling resources is now an imperative task. If 
successful, PermStrucCoop may lead to less duplication and more unity in defence capabilities 
by creating pooled projects and joint R&T initiatives. Closer cooperation in technical matters 
may have an important ‘added value’, leading to common training, and the definition of 
common doctrines. However, it is imperative that concrete criteria and objectives be set so that 
the PermStrucCoop framework can produce tangible targets.  
In any case, various questions emerge from the provision of the PermStrucCoop. Can 
potentially conflicting/duplicating groups exist under the banner of PermStrucCoop? How will 
PermStrucCoop relate to the various bilateral and multilateral projects that already exist in the 
field of security and defence? In addition, the idea behind PermStrucCoop is not new. It has 
been practised in the past in similar forms (e.g., the creation of various groups, such as 
Eurocorps, as well as with the creation of the Battlegroups concept). Will existing security 
projects among EU countries simply be renamed as PermStrucCoop projects? It remains to be 
seen whether PermStrucCoop will make a difference, when experience from the past shows that 
similar projects produced modest results.  4 | VASILIS MARGARAS 
 
In addition, the PermStrucCoop concept may prove divisive if implemented without clear 
guidelines. For example, could it be the case that member states that participate at a certain 
PermStrucCoop group may facilitate an ad hoc mission outside the framework of the EU (i.e. 
participation in an operation without an EU mandate)? Furthermore, different groups of states 
may emerge. Such an outcome may lead to a tricky synchronisation of activities, and potentially 
to a division among the group of countries that are moving forward in a more dynamic way and 
the ones that are lagging behind. Of course, this is not the first time that such a scenario 
emerges, as member states have already adopted a two-speed model for the European Monetary 
Union. However, the impact that such potential development may have on the sensitive domain 
of CSDP is unknown.  
In order to access the prospects of the PermStrucCoop provision, we have to see how it will 
work in practice. Progress on the implementation of PermStrucCoop is relatively slow, 
however. Although various brainstorming sessions have been taking place in the defence 
ministries of the EU member states and in the EU Council, there have been few tangible results 
on how the concept should be put into practice. Precise qualitative and quantitative criteria 
should be set but no one has yet come up with concrete guidelines on what PermStrucCoop 
should include. This is not an easy task if one takes into account that there is no common 
strategic thinking among the Europeans that may lead to a division of labour through the 
PermStrucCoop. The introduction of PermStrucCoop can be seen as an innovative element as it 
may facilitate further cooperation among those member states that want to work closely on 
issues of security. However, it is up to the EU member states to adopt PermStrucCoop in 
practice by pooling resources together. This will require an important change of state 
mentalities; adding a notion of ‘commonality’ to the sovereign nature of defence projects. It is 
up to the EU member states to make PermStrucCoop work; the issue is whether they want to 
make it work. The lack of any strong commitment to CSDP has been part of the problem and 
persists today.  
The Petersberg Tasks and other CSDP related issues 
According to the Lisbon Treaty, the EU subscribes to the Petersberg tasks, which are defined as: 
“...joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and 
assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in 
crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these 
tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third 
countries in combating terrorism in their territories.” (Article 28 of the Lisbon Treaty). 
These tasks are the primary focus of the CSDP as far as its present and future missions are 
concerned. They constitute an important strategic consensus among Europeans and it is positive 
that the EU has agreed upon them as a point of strategic reference. However, the list of tasks 
constitutes a very broad description of aims and allows for considerable divergence in their 
interpretation. The problem of different national interpretations on priorities and ideals 
regarding foreign and security policy is a considerable one as it puts a number of brakes on the 
development of CSDP.  
Other institutional dimensions, which have not been addressed by the Lisbon Treaty, could have 
made the functioning of CSDP simpler. The Lisbon Treaty is characterised by small institutional 
changes that show that progress in the field of security and defence is indeed slow. In the CSDP 
institutional structure, there is still no single Operational Headquarters but the possibility of 
establishing five Operational Headquarter structures in various capitals of the EU member states 
when an EU-led mission materialises. This ‘incomplete structural framework’ functioned well 
for small CSDP projects in the past but does not guarantee efficiency in the event of a major 
crisis. It is only a matter of luck that with the undertaking of so many CSDP missions so far, no  CSDP: NO COMMON STRATEGIC CULTURE, NO MAJOR PROGRESS | 5 
 
major crisis has put the CSDP institutional framework into question. Nevertheless, successful 
strategy cannot rely on pure luck. Pro-Atlanticist countries such as the UK must cede the right 
to a fully-fledged institutional dimension to the CSDP. 
In addition, although various institutional amendments form part of the Lisbon Treaty, the 
Treaty itself does not alter the spirit of external relations of the EU since unanimity regulates 
CFSP/CSDP affairs. Nevertheless, the Lisbon Treaty also mentions that the qualified majority 
voting provision may be used when member states decide to do so. Constructive abstention is 
mentioned in the Treaty with the addition that the existing blocking minority of one third of 
member states now also needs to comprise at least one third of the population of the Union. The 
Treaty also includes a Solidarity Clause in case a member state becomes the object of a terrorist 
attack or natural/man-made disaster. However, there are no sanctions if member states decide to 
pursue their own initiatives in the field of external affairs.  
Another positive dimension of the Lisbon Treaty is that the EU acquires a legal dimension, thus 
making it feasible for the Union to sign international agreements. Still, all these clauses can only 
function if there is a ‘pro-active European spirit’ to assume the global responsibilities befitting 
the size of a big (wealthy) club like the EU.  
Nevertheless, there has been no major policy re-orientation through the use of the Lisbon Treaty 
arrangements. The problem with the effectiveness of EU action in the field of security is not 
only a legal or institutional one. Unfortunately, even the most innovative aspects of the Lisbon 
Treaty risk becoming dead letters if they are not followed up properly. EU politicians have 
shown in the past that whenever there is political will, there is also a solution to security 
problems that emerge. The question though is why there has not been such political will in the 
field of EU security and defence. Part of the answer lies in the fact that Europeans have different 
views on the use of force, different defence traditions and diverging geopolitical interests; none 
of which makes for a common strategic culture.  
3.  Are there common EU ideas and values in the field of security and 
defence?  
No matter the degree of Lisbon Treaty institutionalisation, CSDP is not going to develop further 
unless there is a consensus on the values that underpin it. The Lisbon Treaty also makes an 
explicit claim on values and foreign policy by claiming that the principles of the Union's 
external action are described as those that: 
“have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to 
advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and 
indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, 
the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United 
Nations and the Charter of international law." (Article 21). 
Only if there is a commonly accepted EU normative space through the development of a 
common strategic culture, can the CSDP flourish. Indeed, even the European Security Strategy 
(ESS) (2003, pp. 12-13) mentioned that the EU needs to develop its own strategic culture in 
order to become a more effective player.  
Based on consideration of various academic works, the strategic culture of the EU might be 
defined as: “the ideas and values of Brussels-based ESDP officials regarding the current and 
potential use of force as well as their practices on the deployment of police and military 
instruments in various ESDP missions”. The strategic culture of the EU consists of ideas, values 
and policy practices, which are manifested in the way missions are discussed and planned. 
Strategic culture is influenced by the policy decisions of CSDP as well as by the interaction of 6 | VASILIS MARGARAS 
 
CSDP officials in CSDP institutions. The implementation of CSDP missions is another 
important process in the shaping of strategic culture. Ideas stemming from operations that are 
implemented on the ground are fed into the Brussels-based CSDP decision-making process. 
Elements of strategic culture can also be traced in the historic evolution of the European 
security debate and especially in the marks that this debate left on the shaping of the foreign 
policies of the EU member states in the 1990s.
2  
Main ideas and values in the strategic culture of the EU
3 
Various scholars claim that a particular EU strategic culture is under construction.
4 The 
development of this culture is an ongoing process that has brought small but positive results in 
the field of security and defence. The ‘soft’ approach on the use of force, the development of a 
selective humanitarian agenda, the Petersberg Tasks and the acceptance of a Civilian Crisis 
Management as tools of intervention are the cornerstone values of the strategic culture of the 
EU, but the acquisition of a UN Security Council Mandate and the question of the NATO-EU 
relationship constitute grey areas in the cognitive map of this common culture. In addition, the 
belief in the intergovernmental nature of CSDP, the lack of clearly defined interests and the 
existence of different geographic priorities among the EU member states constitute considerable 
obstacles to the development of a vibrant strategic culture.  
A ‘selective’ humanitarian agenda  
ESDP missions have been developed in various parts of the world in order to tackle various 
humanitarian crises or to contribute to post-conflict measures of confidence. This consensus 
influences the shape of the CSDP and thus underpins its strategic culture. Nevertheless, 
divergences exist when it comes to the ‘interpretation’ of the Petersberg Tasks some member 
states are less willing to engage with ‘combat forces’ than others, for instance; the so-called 
body bag syndrome’ refers to the fact that most European publics are ‘casualties’-sensitive.  
In addition, the idea that Europeans should intervene in the internal affairs of third states (even 
if such action goes against the primacy of their sovereignty) also forms part of an extensive 
consensus that was developed within the EU policy establishment during the 1990s 
humanitarian crises in the Western Balkans. The EU is very selective when it comes to 
intervention. A careful study of the cases where ESDP missions were deployed shows that 
humanitarian crises will be tackled only if they emerge on the doorstep of the EU (e.g., 
Kosovo/Bosnia Herzegovina) or if there are powerful agents within the EU that push for the 
implementation of particular missions (e.g., the case of France regarding CSDP missions in 
Africa).  
Furthermore, it is important to mention that the existence of such a humanitarian consensus does 
not necessarily imply that these humanitarian ideas are equally internalised or respected by the 
different EU member states. It is rather the case that these ideas are accepted as a point of 
reference for the undertaking of strategic action. For instance, the ‘respect for human rights’ that 
is mentioned in EU documents may imply different tools of power in the mindsets of each 
European policy-maker. This is also the case for the key threats as described in the ESS.  
                                                      
2 For a discussion on the European security debate, see K. Longhurst & M. Zaborowksi (2005), Old 
Europe, New Europe and the Transatlantic Security Agenda, London and New York: Routledge.  
3 The data provided in this article is extracted from 66 interviews conducted in the period between 
January and December 2007-9 on this subject by the author. The findings of the study point to the 
conclusion that the strategic culture of the EU is characterised by its own values but also by its particular 
weaknesses. 
4 See the works of Cornish & Edwards (2001, 2005), Rynning, (2003), Hyde-Price (2005) on this subject.  CSDP: NO COMMON STRATEGIC CULTURE, NO MAJOR PROGRESS | 7 
 
A cautious development of Civilian Crisis Management instruments 
The idea of tackling security issues through an integrated approach that includes civilian and 
military instruments is widely accepted by all EU member states. After 10 years of CSDP 
missions, one can observe that the ‘civilian’ agenda is well-rooted in this particular policy as 
civilian missions outnumber military missions by a ratio of two to one. The conduct of Civilian 
Crisis Management (CCM) implies that out-of-border interventions may take place in order to 
deal with a humanitarian/political conflict or a natural/environmental disaster. Cooperation 
between the military and civilian instruments is necessary in order to tackle the complexities of 
particular crises. However, there is a gap between the rhetoric of CSDP and its practical 
implementation. Because of the limited resources that EU member states invest in the EU 
Civilian Headline Goal, progress in this field is still slow. In this respect, the Lisbon Treaty 
constitutes a major paradox: despite the fact that the majority of the CSDP missions are civilian, 
it mostly commits member states to undertake measures in order to improve only their military 
capabilities, whereas there is no equivalent measure regarding civilian capabilities. 
The importance of national sovereignty in the fields of security and defence 
The fields of security and defence have remained stubbornly under the auspices of the member 
states. Decision-making in the CSDP field is subject to member state veto and requires 
unanimity. Achieving unity and cohesion in issues of security is difficult. Problems of 
synchronisation and synergy are not only part of CSDP but also haunt one of the oldest and 
most stable security institutions of post-World War II Europe: NATO. A new way of thinking 
needs to take hold. Such thinking is not encouraged by the Lisbon Treaty, which maintains the 
intergovernmental nature of security and defence. The Lisbon Treaty should have paid attention 
to how member states prepare their procurement strategies so that harmonisation could have 
started at the national level. Although various EU member states have transformed some of their 
national resources into military and police instruments ready to be deployed in out-of-area 
missions, progress in terms of ‘out of borders’ deployment is still limited. Out of more than two 
million staff in uniform in the EU27, only 10-15% is estimated to be deployable.
5 Duplication 
of resources, conscription and various technical gaps constitute major weaknesses and affect the 
progress of the CSDP. The fact that the EU member states are in general unwilling to invest 
further in ‘out-of-area’ deployment of forces limits the potential strategic action of the EU.  
Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty also mentions that if an EU member state becomes a victim of 
armed aggression then “the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and 
assistance by all the means in their power”. However, the article does not mention the use of 
‘military’ assistance to tackle such aggression, which is another sign of cautiousness on the part 
of the Europeans when it comes to engaging with the question of defence.  
Lack of clearly defined EU interests 
The failure to draft a new updated version of the ESS that would address its shortcomings 
demonstrates the existence of different (and even conflicting) opinions of EU states in the field 
of geopolitics. Unfortunately, EU unity in security is not the norm. Various EU member states 
still deploy missions unilaterally, in order to satisfy their own geopolitical interests, before 
reaching an agreement with their EU counterparts. National reflexes prevail over a commonly 
defined EU interest. However, new geopolitical challenges arise that may bring Europeans 
closer together in their strategic thinking. Strategic change is not a new phenomenon as many 
studies in strategic culture point to the fact that the process of strategic culture formation is open 
                                                      
5 Biscop (2008: 2) in S. Biscop & F. Algieri (eds) (2008), The Lisbon Treaty and ESDP: Transformation 
and Integration, The Egmont Institute, Brussels.  8 | VASILIS MARGARAS 
 
to new interpretations of emerging challenges and threats.
6 For instance, the case of piracy in 
the straits of Somalia shows that, in a globalised world, emerging security threats may push 
Europeans to a definition of new common economic interests, such as the protection of free 
trade routes.  
Different geographic parameters among EU member states 
The existence of different geographic spheres of interest among EU partners is another point of 
divergence that helps explain the lack of clearly defined EU interests. The geographic space of 
the Western Balkans is where, so far, Europeans have managed to act in the most coordinated 
way through ESDP – although with considerable limitations. However, the case of the Western 
Balkans is an exception to the rule, as a similar process of ‘claiming responsibility’ has not 
occurred in other parts of the world. Although recent trends of African engagement are 
encouraging, this is mostly due to the French insistence on investing in the CSDP-African 
dimension rather than a consolidated willingness among EU partners to intervene in the 
continent. The Europeans have not yet fully ‘internalised’ the idea of assuming global 
responsibility. Contributions regarding ‘far away’ missions still depend on an ad hoc 
cooperation among groups of countries that express an interest in participating in them rather 
than on a long-term, well-defined EU strategy.  
Furthermore, when it comes to missions that need to be implemented in areas farther abroad, 
there is an important ‘capabilities gap’ between small EU member states with limited resources 
and bigger EU member states (such as France and the UK), which possess the necessary means 
for deploying demanding long-term missions. Therefore, there is a planning gap between the 
countries that possess instruments and those that do not. Unfortunately, this capabilities gap also 
creates different perceptions (and consequently different values) in terms of strategic thinking, 
since various EU officials envisage a ‘narrower’ field of strategic action than others. Regarding 
this issue, though, it is worth mentioning that the provision of PermStrucCoop may play an 
important role by providing a space for capabilities upgrading. 
Multilateralism and its limitations (the EU-NATO conundrum) 
Various CSDP missions were (or still are) open to contributions from third countries and 
institutions such as ASEAN, the African Union, the UN and NATO. However, cooperation with 
third countries and institutions is not always an easy task. This is due to the fact that the 
priorities and structures of third countries/institutions are not always similar to those of the EU. 
For instance, one can detect different strategic approaches when it comes to the question of the 
Russian inclusion in the European security architecture.
7  
Another important cause of conflict among Europeans is the depth of the EU-NATO 
relationship. Although the importance of NATO in CSDP is undisputed, there is no convergence 
on the issue of how far European autonomy should be developed vis-à-vis NATO. The different 
strands of thinking are reflected in the Lisbon Treaty, which states that the foreign policy of the 
Union: 
“shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence of certain 
Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see 
                                                      
6 S.J. Lantis (2005), “Strategic Culture: from Clausewitz to Constructivism”, Strategic Insights, Vol. IV, 
No. 10, pp. 1-13, Center for Contemporary Conflict, Monterey, California 
(http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Oct/lantisOct05.asp, accessed on 20/01/2006). 
7 For instance, on the Europe-Russia relation, see the paper by S. Dias Fernandes (2009), Time to 
Reassess the European Security Architecture? The NATO-EU-Russia Security Triangle, EPIN Working 
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their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 
under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and 
defence policy established within that framework” (Article 17). 
The division between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe on the question of Iraq in 2003 highlighted the 
different belief systems among Europeans. Although the divisions on the Iraq war seem now to 
be forgotten, divergences on other important strategic issues are still evident today. It remains to 
be seen whether the ‘Obama era’ will ease the tensions of the past by bringing a new 
cooperative approach to transatlantic relations. Nevertheless, the idea that in certain cases a 
CSDP mission should take place under an EU flag (independent of NATO) is slowly being 
consolidated in the minds of CSDP officials. However, Atlanticism is still very strong in certain 
EU countries. No EU member state wants to take any major risks that may further alienate the 
EU from the US. The adherence to Atlanticism also shows a lack of self-esteem and a tendency 
to avoid the assumption of responsibility on the part of some EU member states. The Lisbon 
Treaty recognises the role of NATO as a body that is in charge of the defence of its EU member 
states. However, the Treaty also consists of a Solidarity Clause, which implies that a progressive 
framing of common security and defence may be possible in the future, thus leaving room for 
optimism about the assumption of defence duties in the future.  
Disagreement over the importance of acquiring the UN Security Council mandate 
as a legitimising tool for CSDP missions 
So far, it can be claimed that military action within the framework of CSDP takes place only 
when mandated by international law. Indeed, the issue of acquiring a UN Security Council 
(UNSC) mandate is still important, as it provides public and political legitimacy to the 
undertaking of security missions. For some EU member states the acquisition of a UNSC 
mandate is a valuable prerequisite to participate in a security mission, while for others it is less 
so. The difference of opinion on the priority of the UNSC mandate is proof of another important 
division among EU states when it comes to the legalisation of the use of force. It demonstrates 
that there are countries that demand the ‘green light’ of intervention by an international body 
whereas others prefer to cooperate within ‘coalitions of the willing’ in order to promote their 
own strategic plans. This division created various problems of ESDP cohesion in the past and 
will resurface every time a challenging crisis occurs. On this particular issue, the Lisbon Treaty 
recognises the importance of the ‘rule of law’ but does not go into detail about what this term 
means. Therefore, the necessity of the UNSC mandate is another issue that depends on the 
preferences of EU member states, Still, it is important to mention that CSDP trends so far point 
to the fact that acquiring a UNSC mandate is a facilitating factor in order to reach a consensus 
among EU member states. 
4. Conclusions 
Various institutional innovations have been included in the Lisbon Treaty in order to address the 
cohesion and effectiveness problem of the EU. However, this policy paper adopts a more 
‘constructivist’ approach, arguing that ‘ideas matter’. Unless the EU acquires its own solid 
strategic culture, it will not be able to act in an efficient way in the field of security and defence. 
The acquisition of such a strategic culture is no easy task. Member state strategic cultures have 
been strongly consolidated, since they have followed the identity formation of their own 
national identities. The EU needs to engage in a construction of its own strategic culture that 
will combine elements of the strategic cultures of its member states, but since the strategic 
cultures of EU states are somewhat contradictory (e.g., ‘Atlanticist’ versus ‘Europeanist’), the 
difficulty of such a task can be appreciated. 10 | VASILIS MARGARAS 
 
Nevertheless, due to the successful development of CSDP, it can be argued that the EU 
possesses its own nascent strategic culture, characterised by certain values and ideas. This 
strategic culture has the Petersberg Tasks at its epicentre and is characterised by a selective 
approach to humanitarian crises. The strategic culture of the EU is based on a selective 
protection of human rights and the promotion of law. The EU humanitarian agenda is still 
important, as most CSDP missions have a humanitarian background. However, these terms have 
not found their way into clearly defined EU strategies and remain loose and open to 
interpretation, as may fit the different (and conflicting) interests of the EU member states.  
Although the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty may bring some positive amendments to the 
CFSP/CSDP, it is highly unlikely that these institutional developments alone will provide the 
stimulus for further robust external action. The strategic culture of the EU suffers from a lack of 
defined EU interests as well as from the insistence of EU member states on maintaining 
intergovernmentalism as the main form of decision-making. Different geographic approaches 
among EU states and the cultural differences between ‘new’-er and ‘old’-er EU nations 
constitute a hindrance to its development. Other issues also manifest its weakness; the 
Atlanticist strategic culture of the EU being one, and the nature of the EU-US relationship still 
needs to be properly defined. Furthermore, the importance of a UN Security Council mandate 
prior to the undertaking of CSDP missions remains important but is not accepted by all 
countries as the primary prerequisite for strategic action.  
The strategic actorness of the CSDP is mostly limited to relatively small missions. Such 
cautiousness risks rendering the EU a repository of small symbolic humanitarian missions with 
little impact on the global geopolitical agenda. If the CSDP is to succeed it needs both the 
political will to proceed with the CSDP agenda and a concrete signal of engagement in its 
capabilities. The era of being content with mini-institutional developments at EU level is over. 
The EU needs firm commitment to common projects and a generous dose of self-criticism in 
order to move forward. The EU cannot simply hide behind the gaps in the Lisbon Treaty. It has 
to assume more responsibility if it wants to count as a global actor. 
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